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Understanding our changing relationship with space: an international political economy reading of 
space popularisation  
  
 
  
1. Introduction 
  
Outer space and the skies to which to turn our gaze, are as central to human existence as the earth 
upon which we stand. For millennia, we have imagined outer space, and drawn on space for 
artistic, cultural and religious inspiration. However, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have 
altered our perception of space: outer space is no longer solely the remit of myths, legends and 
changing religious beliefs. Mankind has been to space, has harnessed near outer space for popular 
usage and has turned the basis for mythology and mystery into an aspect of our earthbound 
existence. Indeed, space-activity not only forms the basis of much popular fiction, but also provides 
material for contemporary media events. The moon landings in the late 1960s and early 1970s saw 
the dawn of international, live televised broadcasting and secured the place of space-activity as an 
element of pop-culture. Moreover, the popular use of space exploration to sell products, 
and the ever-increasing use of downstream space technologies and space-based satellite 
communication tools means that space-activity is as ubiquitous to 20th and 21st centuries as the 
capitalist consumerism it relies on for continued funding and the products that space-activities 
promote and advertise.  
  
How we relate to outer space relies on dominant understandings which hinge on the knowledge to 
which we are exposed. Space-activity is no longer based only in ‘science fiction’, nor reserved for 
astronauts and astronomers. Access to the internet, television and inexpensive telescopic 
equipment, alongside engagement with the products of space technology, means that popular 
interaction with space is an ever evolving and growing phenomenon.  Early interactions with space 
based religious festivals on the cycles of the moon: for example, early Christianity tied the Easter 
festival to the “Sunday following the full moon which coincided with, or fell next after, the vernal 
equinox” [1]. As space technology has increased, so too has our understanding of the realm beyond 
our own, and as technology has spread, so too has public engagement. Although we have looked to 
the skies since time immemorial, the twentieth century was as a watershed period for space 
engagement: outer space became a tool in the Cold War, and with that, a tool not only of military 
strength, but also of power through knowledge, ideals and dominant discourse. As such, notions of 
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outer space entered the lexicon of popular culture, featuring in art, music, film 
and the cultural sphere of the mid-twentieth century.  
 
The first moon landing in 1969 precipitated enormous global enthusiasm for space and its 
technologies. However, other events, wars, recessions and depressions have prevented both the 
continued excitement, and continued manned space flight to the moon; as Smith notes “By the end 
[of the Apollo moon landings in 1972]…recession was bearing down and a darker harsher world was 
emerging” [2]. However, despite the drop in public space fervour and indeed in conscious interest in 
space-going activity, public, albeit often unconscious, engagement with space has in fact increased 
exponentially with the increase in space based technologies such as the GPS network, satellite 
television, mobile phone use, widespread broadband availability, and use of mobile 3 and 4G 
internet services. This paper argues that although we have seen a drop in the pop-culture use of 
space as a topic of interest, we have not seen a drop in public engagement with space, or public 
usage of space based technologies: what we have seen is a shift in engagement with space from 
an ideals based knowledge structure to a production based knowledge structure. We argue that this 
may be termed a technological shift: from conscious engagement and discourse formation in the 
1950s and 1960s, to an unconscious technological engagement in the 2000s and 2010s.  
  
Acknowledging that popular engagement with outer space has increased with the spread of space-
based technologies, this paper establishes a two-fold understanding of the term ‘space 
popularisation’, linked to the political-economic structures of knowledge, power and hegemonic 
dominance. First, this article notes that the popularisation of space can be discussed in terms of the 
use of space and space activity by authors, poets, artists, and musicians as inspiration: thus 
popularising the topic of space while enhancing the cultural and artistic sphere in terms of what we 
may term an aspect of the cultural or knowledge structure of power. Second, this paper will 
emphasise the ever increasing and enhanced use of space for everyday communications, and the 
‘popular’ use of downstream space technologies as everyday products. The spread of space based 
communication products, we class as the spread of knowledge and production, forming part of the 
important power structures outlined by Susan Strange.   
  
This paper addresses theoretical debates based in the school of International Political Economy (IPE), 
using empirical discussion of space activity alongside theoretical debate, to analyse and examine 
both the issues of power and the global hegemonic knowledge structure, and the question of space 
activity, space use and popular engagement.   
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In a first section, this paper will address questions relating to power, the relationship between 
different forms of power and critically evaluate theories of power and the extent to which we can 
apply their major tenets to the issues of space activity and its popularisation. This section will then 
provide a critical overview of Susan Strange's work, focusing largely on her four structures of power 
as outlined in her seminal work "States and Markets" [3]. From this, we take a closer analysis of one 
particular power structure, the knowledge structure, and ask; to what extent and in which specific 
ways does the knowledge-as-power structure impact on space popularisation, and vice versa?; is it 
impacted upon by the exploration of space? In a second section, this article will explore aspects of 
the history of public engagement with space, and space popularisation. In this section, knowledge is 
addressed in two ways: first in terms of knowledge as ideas, ideals and ideology, the extent to which 
popularisation is used to form dominant discourses and cement political ideology; second, 
knowledge is addressed as it combines with the production structure to create what we term, 
technology. In a concluding section, this paper suggests that a shift has occurred from knowledge as 
ideals and ideology forming the basis for space popularisation to knowledge as technology forming 
the basis for public engagement with space.  
  
  
2. International relations and space power  
  
The politics and international relations of space activity is an area of academic study that has not yet 
attracted wide-scale discussion. As such, this area of analysis does not have the theoretical basis that 
has developed around other, land based, aspects of international relations. Subsequently, to analyse 
relations in space we must borrow frameworks of analysis from other cognate disciplines. This article 
thus discusses power, realist political structure and the international political economy, to develop a 
framework of analysis which allows the analysis of international relations in space. Starting with a 
general analysis of power, this section will then move to a realist reading of power before addressing 
Susan Strange’s interpretation of the international political economy, through which we establish 
the basis of evaluation for this paper. 
 
Power is central to space activity and space exploration on several different levels, from the political 
to the physical. According to NASA, the USA’s national space agency, “the three Space Shuttle Main 
Engines, in conjunction with the Solid Rocket  Boosters… consume[d] liquid fuel at a rate that would 
drain an average family swimming pool in under 25 seconds generating over 37 million horse power” 
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[4] as they propelled the Shuttle spaceward. Alternatively, we can define power as a precise astro-
physics equation used to generate the calculations necessary for space flight. In this sense, power 
can be calculated as work / time: “power is the work done in a unit of time… a measure of how 
quickly work can be done” [5].  These conceptions of power are essential to the space sector, and 
are therefore essential to the contemporary forms of popular engagement with outer space that 
require hardware to be sent to, and to operate outside, the earth’s atmosphere. However, in space, 
we see several different important forms of power at play: power has political, economic and 
social synonyms of equal importance to the space sector; these relate to states, international 
relationships, public private partnerships and cultural development. If we look to International 
Relations (IR) theories, and theories of international political economy, we begin to understand what 
power is, where it comes from, and why it truly is central to space exploration, travel and activity.  
   
2.1 Space relations, international relations  
 
The analysis of international relations played out in space not only suffers a paucity of theoretical 
discussion due to its relatively recent appearance on the academic table, but also due to the state, 
and land, based assumptions made by most relevant frameworks. That is not to say that such 
discussions are, however, irrelevant. Although realist conceptions of international relations consider 
the state to be the main currency of international political interactions, they also understand 
sovereignty and security to be the commodities that are most clearly sought [6], issues that are also 
at the heart of space power and space politics. And, while the international relations, or geopolitics 
of outer-space may be considered by some theorists to surpass the sovereign limits of the state – as 
Pfaltzgraff [7] notes “what is unique about space is the fact that we are dealing with infinity. 
Whereas the terrestrial land mass and the seas have knowable finite bounds, we literally do not 
know where space ends or understand the implications of infinity or how we theorize about space” - 
others argue that statist and global debates are relevant to any area in which states fight for 
supremacy and influence.  On this, Herzfeld [8] notes: “Because of the strategic value of 
space…space commands special importance and has become a critical national resource”. Moreover, 
reaching outer space, and all business conducted in outer space is done either by nation states or 
corporations acting along state based assumptions of global power relations. Theories of 
international relations and geopolitics cannot therefore be ignored despite the area of discussion 
lying outside the traditional realm of the ‘state’ or indeed the international arena. Pfaltzgraff [7] 
further notes that “Because all IR theories either describe or prescribe interactions and relationships, 
space becomes yet another arena in which to theorize about the behaviour of the world’s political 
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units”, and that the worlds’ political units, be they states or non-state actors, seek power. All space 
activity is therefore carried out by power seeking political units, or wealth seeking corporate units: 
as Pfaltzgraff [7] tells us, “Space is an arena in which competition and cooperation are already set 
forth in terms and issues reminiscent of Earth-bound phenomena. Space power includes 
assumptions drawn from IR theory.”  
 
Indeed, if discussing Earth-bound phenomena, we should note that our near orbit, or inner usable 
atmosphere, might be considered earth space rather than outer-space given our use of the area, its 
proximity and its distinction from the rest of the unknown and unusable universe. Indeed, we can 
compare its use to other important trade, transport and communication routes or tools. Leissle [9] 
notes that “this has happened earlier in history” and draws a comparison between space and 
notions of the ‘high seas’. Leissle discusses the development of international regimes for space, via 
analysis of naval power from the sixteenth century to the early early twentieth century as regards 
the assumption that states require access to both for economic, social and security advancement 
and provision: all areas in which the state and other actors have rational and clear objectives to 
fulfil. On such a view of space, we note that its popularisation is moot: space is essential to 
contemporary politics and modern, everyday life. 
 
2.2 The power of popularisation  
 
Regarding the relationship between power and popularisation, Dolman in his 2005 analysis 
Astropolitik [10] notes that public perception of space exploration and activity has largely been 
mistaken. He suggests that “The popular vision of the exploration of space…is that of a cooperative 
effort by all humanity…It has certainly not been perceived in terms of the statist Astropolitik model 
here associated with the harsh and competitive diplomatic doctrine of Realpolitik. But that latter 
mode undeniably was the vehicle that propelled mankind into space”. On this view, we note 
that while the popular view of space exploration traces a liberal International Relations trajectory, 
the state view of space activity is largely based in realist ideology. Given this, we might surmise that 
popular opinion, popularisation, and the popular knowledge structure is less important to space 
power than other modes and structures of power – namely military power and security 
advantage. Given the focus on realist conceptions of state interactions in space, several other 
authors have suggested drawing upon nineteenth century and early twentieth century models of 
analysis for sea power in discussing and analysing space power. Indeed, if we apply high seas theory 
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to the issue of space politics and space international relations, we can shed some light on multi-
lateral, bi-lateral and state-commercial relations that come with this area of study.  
 
Jon Sumida in his essay Old Thoughts New Problems: Mahan and the Consideration of Spacepower 
[11] presents an application of Mahan’s theory The influence of sea power upon history to space. In 
seeking an applicable theory for space power and the challenges it poses, Sumida discusses two 
important aspects of Mahan’s high seas theory. First, he notes that if any side in a dispute possessed 
“absolute sea command or, in special cases even temporary local control, naval operations in direct 
support of land forces could be of decisive importance” [11]. Second, Sumida notes Mahan’s 
argument that technological improvement could never eliminate the “tactical and strategic 
uncertainty from the conduct of war” [11]. These three problematiques draw Sumida towards a 
series of applications of sea power theory to space: he suggests that space activity will have “large 
and growing economic effects and will therefore be highly significant for the economic future of the 
United States” [11] and we would assume, be highly significant for other powerful states. He further 
notes that “The security requirements of space based economic activity will involve costs that are 
beyond the means of any single nation state” [11]  thus suggesting that based on the experience of 
sea-power challenges, interested states will need to form cooperative associations, bi-lateral or 
multi-lateral agreements to benefit fully from space activity. However, Sumida further notes that the 
development and defence of space activity will be “largely determined by private capitalism and 
other nation-states with major interests in the space economy” [11]. He thus suggests that the era of 
state based space exploration may be coming to an end, and that we should expect the start of an 
era of multi-lateral cooperation and private finance in space exploration and activity. This is already 
evident in examples such as Elon Musk’s Space X and Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic projects. 
  
Where the core of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power argument is the relationship between 
the economy, the state and the military power of the national navy, Sumida [11] notes that the 
issues that prompted Mahan to write, are very similar to the challenges presented today by 
space. Indeed, as Sumida notes, the interconnectedness and the “relationship between the 
economic basis of national strength and the development and effective use of a navy” [11] are 
reminiscent of the International Political Economy’s (IPE) assumptions regarding the 
interconnectedness of wealth, security, production and knowledge / ideas. These assumptions sit at 
the cross roads of analysis for space activity, and any analysis of space must therefore take these, 
and their accompanying theories of International Political Economy, into consideration.  
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Although theories of International Relations are important to the issue of space power and space 
popularisation, their realist beliefs and liberal interconnectivity assumptions fail to take into account 
the power of ideas and ideology.  To address this gap, we now turn to Susan Strange’s interpretation 
of international political economy, which, with its clear focus on several facets of power including 
that of ideas and ideology, serves to provide a more detailed discussion. 
 
 
3. Strange Times: Space, Power and the International Political Economy 
  
As noted above, liberal and realist conceptions of power in IR can shed light on many political 
situations, and indeed can aid understanding of space power through application of nineteenth 
century theories on sea power. However, to fully understand the geopolitics of space and popular 
engagement with space it is essential to look more deeply at international power relations. Theories 
of International Political Economy (IPE) and the analysis of power in the global system that 
accompanies such theories, provide a useful theoretical framework and contextual 
backdrop through which to examine the question of space knowledge and space popularisation. 
The particular conception of power used in this analysis is derived from Susan Strange’s works on 
hegemony, structural power and the relationship between states and markets. Lieberman [12] 
argues that space activity and exploration have occupied an important place at the centre of the 
International Political Economy’s (IPE) structures of power, as discussed by Susan Strange, in terms 
of military, security, wealth, finance, production, knowledge, ideas and discourse. This paper argues 
that since the middle of the twentieth century, over and above its contributions to science and 
technology, space activity has contributed to the production / knowledge structure through down-
stream technologies and public engagement with space-based products and services. Furthermore, 
looking through the lens of IPE power structures, we note that space activity has demonstrated its 
worth to the knowledge structure through arts, culture, film, television, literature and music.  
  
Strange informs us that hegemonic power resides in four “interacting structures” [3], each facet 
touching as in a four sided pyramid. She suggests that structural power resides in “control over 
security; control over production; control over credit; and control over knowledge, belief and ideas” 
in a manner that “each is supported, joined to and held up by the other three” [3]. Other articles 
have emphasised the importance of Susan Strange’s work on power for the space industry, and 
space going technology. Lieberman [12] emphasises the extent to which space activity demonstrates 
the importance of, draws on and advances power in all four of these hegemonic power structures, 
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suggesting that space activity is a prerequisite for those states with hegemonic, or power ambitions. 
However, while we might assume that power is gained, achieved, used and played with mostly in 
terms of military and finance, holding structural, hegemonic power requires much more than brute 
force. First and foremost, to display hegemonic power, and to create the weapons required to have 
military dominance, involves having the best ideas and the most inspirational technology. To do this 
and retain the support of the populace requires winning over the hearts and minds of the people. 
Space technology is the fulcrum at the centre of the four power structures: it requires the power of 
great knowledge, ideas and ideals; it provides security; it requires, demonstrates and creates wealth; 
it demonstrates and advances production, and its technology and technological advances can be 
seen both to create knowledge, while simultaneously requiring knowledge. 
 
3.1 Pop power  
 
It is therefore clear that, space power is important to international relations, and that it relates to 
the military and security aspects of both relational and structural power. However, if we return to 
Susan Strange and her four inter-connected spheres of power, finance, military, knowledge and 
production, we note that winning the hearts and minds of the people, or winning the cultural or 
‘ideas’ battle is arguably the most important aspect of state power, and a hugely important aspect in 
terms of gaining and maintaining global power and influence.  Ideas, and the popularisation of ideas, 
are therefore central to any theory of power, and space power is no different.   
 
To analyse the popularisation of space, this paper will now adopt a two-fold perception of 
knowledge and power. First, knowledge in terms of ideals, ideological discourse, pop culture, art, 
music, film, and its propagation of “beliefs and ideas” as defined by Strange. Second, knowledge as 
“technology” in terms of its definition by Lawton, Rosenau and Verdun [13] as “the application 
of knowledge in production”. These two conceptions of knowledge and power form two connected 
ways in which we can view space exploration and activity.  
  
4. Knowledge: ideas and technology 
  
Human desire to understand space, reach space and use space has provided centuries of clear and 
focussed impetus for breakthroughs in science and for great technological development. However, 
science and technology are not the only spheres that have been greatly influenced by space. Space 
exploration, activity, and desire have also had an important and significant impact on contemporary 
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cultural history through the inspiration outer space provides to the arts and popular culture. 
Moreover, achievement in space, the breaching of the final frontiers to which humankind has gazed 
for millennia, has had a cultural impact cementing political ideals and creating the foundations of 
structural knowledge patterns that will outlive current geopolitical strategy and corporate input. 
  
Drawing on the above discussion of power and the international political economy school of 
thought, this analysis will now turn to an examination of space activity from an ‘ideas’ perspective 
and a ‘technology’ perspective. This will provide a clear analysis of state power and geopolitical 
power in terms of ideas, ideals and space culture; and in terms of knowledge and space technology. 
Both form part of the knowledge structure as outlined by Susan Strange in her iconic work States 
and Markets [3] but incorporate different aspects for discussion. In this second section, we will first 
look to the power accorded to states through the formation of ideas, beliefs and a dominant 
discourse based on space; and second, discuss the power potential of technology.  As 
Lawton, Rosenau and Verdun [13] note, “Technology is generally defined as the application of 
knowledge in production”: which, using the IPE framework discussed, can be described as the 
meeting place of the knowledge and production power structures [3].  In a final concluding section, 
this paper will aim to answer the question of whether greater power is conferred on the holder of 
knowledge power as ideas, or knowledge power as technology.  
  
4.1 Knowledge as ideas 
  
Susan Strange defines power through four important structures, and classes knowledge as ranking 
alongside production, wealth and security in terms of importance [3]. Space is hugely important to 
the structures of production, wealth and security, but is also linked closely to the knowledge 
structure through its role in terms of technology advancement and value production, which many 
would argue, lies at the epitome of any power structure.  
 
Throughout history, space has been present in the lives of human beings. As such, stories have been 
told, ideas formed and ideologies created around outer space which have combined to create 
different forms of power. Indeed, although the twentieth century saw great leaps forward in terms 
of space travel, space exploration, scientific knowledge and popular engagement with space, the 
‘popularisation’ of space began much earlier, and space has long been ‘popular’ with mankind. 
As Makemson [14] observes, “No one knows, of course, how many thousands of years have elapsed 
since men first began to wonder about the sun moon and stars, but the great wealth of 
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archaeological material having an astronomical basis from Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas 
leads one to the conclusion that there came a time in human history when men looked upon the 
heavenly bodies as sublime powers from whom their sustenance came and on whose benevolence 
their whole existence depended”. The stars and celestial bodies have been a source of fascination, 
myth and religion since the times of the earliest found forms of records and rock engravings, and no 
doubt earlier.  
  
4.2 Knowledge and popular culture  
 
In contemporary times, interest in space going pursuits seems to have waned. However, the impact 
of space on culture and our cultural understanding of dominant discourses and ideals appears to not 
have followed suit.  Indeed, it could be noted that in the twentieth century we witnessed a spike in 
what we may term ‘space interest’ or space popularisation, and despite a drop in easily observable 
space activity, the twenty first century has seen space become more, rather than less, important to 
global populations. In terms of knowledge, as ideas, ideological thinking and as an enabler of cultural 
thinking, we cannot overestimate the contribution made by space. Within the arts and our more 
general understanding of historical and contemporary cultural heritage, space exploration and space 
travel have had an impact like no other subject matter, illustrated by the increased number of space 
outputs at times of particular interest. For example, the profusion of science fiction films released 
during the 1960s illustrates the impact that space exploration had on the arts of the time, and 
correspondingly, the impact space had on the ideas and dominant ideologies of the time. While 
cinematic representation of outer space is popular, because, as King and Kryzwinska note, it “deals 
with the problems and promises offered by science, technology and rationality” [15]; other aspects 
of the arts sector have also drawn upon outer space for inspiration. David Bowie, always the 
zeitgeist, recorded Space Oddity in 1969, one month before Apollo 11 landed on the moon: 
as Billboard notes, “Bowie’s early embrace of science fiction was a sign of the times” [16]. Bowie’s 
influence has continued to the present day through a new audience and the rise of social media.  
 
Chris Hadfield, while on the International Space Station (ISS) gave us an insight into his own outer-
space life, and re-popularised David Bowie’s space musings: his “zero gravity version of…Space 
Oddity” received over 10 million views in its first three days online” [17]. Although it is supposed 
that conscious interest in space activity has waned since the 1960s, through their engaging use of 
social media Hadfield and later Tim Peake, have increased awareness of space exploration for a 
whole new generation. In 2016, Tim Peake reignited the imagination of the British population by 
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completing a space-walk, running the London Marathon from the ISS and talking directly to school 
children [18] thus recreating a dominant discourse of interest in space, and promoting the idea that 
the knowledge production, the science and the technology needed for space exploration are worth 
the financial expenditure.  
 
4.3 The celluloid space  
 
Regarding the use of film, to which we suggest adding the newer concept of social media, to 
promote ideological aims or to create and cement dominant discourse, Dodds notes that the use of 
politics in fiction, film and music is an important cultural phenomenon, and acknowledges that it has 
had an important impact on the study of international relations. He tells us that “Over that last ten 
years [from 1995 – 2005], disciplines such as International Relations (IR) have embraced the so-
called ‘return of culture’ in a variety of ways. It has been raised not only as an issue of forthcoming 
insecurity in the form of civilisations and corresponding clashes, but also in the context of how 
popular culture might influence/shape/reproduce the foreign and security policies of governments” 
[19]. In this vein, we might suggest that the moon landings provided the ultimate back drop for the 
Cold War. Indeed, within the discipline of international relations, the Cold War is recognised as a war 
for hearts and minds, or ideas and ideals, as much as it was a war for territory or geopolitical 
strategic gain. While the USA and the Soviet Union fought for state based supremacy both on land 
and in space, and achieved new heights in technological development, corporations, film, music and 
cultural iconography adopted space as a watchword for both forward looking modernity a new 
found cultural insecurity [20]. Given the different uses and interpretations of space activity, the 
cultural adoption of space sought to cement political ideology in cultural output and thus provides 
interesting clues to societal interpretations of International Relations.   
  
More specifically, we note that the politics of the bi-polar power structure has enjoyed a variety of 
fictional representations, from James Bond to American science-fiction. For Robert Heinlein, the 
Cold War has provided the backdrop, and space the inspiration for many works. Heinlein’s 1949 
novel The Long Watch dealt with “an attempted military coup on the US Moon Base” [19] while his 
1950 screenplay Destination Moon charted a space race between the USA and the Soviets, and 
emphasised “the strategic importance of near space” [21]. The use of the Cold War in films and 
literature, emphasising the Soviet Union as threat, has continued.  As Dodds notes, Bond films are 
“filled with explicit references to so-called allies and friends (e.g. the United States) and adversaries 
(e.g. the Soviet Union and China)” and are “always sensitive and sensitised by the prevailing Cold 
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War conflict” [19]. But action is not the only genre to use space and Cold War themes.  King 
and Kryzwinska note that “science fiction dominates many of our movie screens and can be seen as 
a powerful cultural barometer of our times”, indeed, as they further note, it is a genre which 
“extends into a wider range of industrial, historical and cultural contexts” [15]. 
  
The impact of space on our contemporary cultural history and our understanding of political 
relations is hugely important. However, while the impact of space on culture and especially film is 
instantly clear, the impact on politics and international relations may be less so. If we return to 
Susan Strange [3] and her four structures of power, we note that the knowledge structure is always 
as important as the structures of wealth, security and production. If this is the case, then the use of 
space to form ideologies, create discourse and develop popular cultural awareness is paramount to 
the successful harnessing of power in politics and international relations. During the Cold War, and 
indeed since, space has come to form an essential part of our cultural story: tied as it is to discourses 
of alliance and enmity, technological prowess and modernity.  
  
  
5. Space Technology: knowledge as a transformative force  
  
Not only is space tied closely to the generation of discourse, cultural ideas and ideologies, but it has 
provided the motivation behind the creation of knowledge and the production of technological 
manufacturing know-how, and has done since Lippershey and Galileo Galilee sought to create an 
instrument through which to view the stars in the seventeenth century. Indeed, the advancement of 
technology due to humanity’s desire to reach and understand the stars cannot be understated. 
Identifying technology as a concept brings together two of Susan Strange’s structures of power, 
knowledge and production and is central to the analysis of space and its ‘popularisation’; most 
specifically to the increased use of space hardware and ever deeper public engagement with space-
based technologies. Strange does not discuss technology development per se within her States and 
Markets analysis; she does, however, develop the idea of “secondary power structures” [3] a title 
she assigns to the areas of transport, trade, energy and welfare, and a title that Lieberman [12] 
suggests would be attached to communication technologies was Strange writing today.  Ideas, 
innovation and inspiration promote technological advance, and in terms of military interventions, 
technology innovation is often precipitated and accelerated by war. If we look to the closing scenes 
of the Second World War, we see this process clearly. The accelerated advances made in space 
technology and space exploration perfectly illustrate the importance of the knowledge structure, 
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alongside the power structures of production and wealth, coming together create defence: i.e. to 
use Strange’s terminology, great power in the production and knowledge structure combining to 
provide power in the security structure [3]. Indeed, we argue that space was popularised as a tool to 
demonstrate technological superiority during the Cold War and continues to be used for this 
purpose today. 
  
5.1 Knowledge as ideas versus knowledge as technology  
 
Knowledge, whether discussed as ideas, ideals, ideologies, discourses or production techniques, is a 
difficult concept to quantify and a difficult medium to transfer, steal or adopt.  As Lawton, Rosenau 
and Verdun note, “The cumulative and firm specific nature of knowledge means that there are no 
quick fixes to the learning process, nor is it easy to leap frog, as frequently assumed into totally new 
areas of technology” [13]. They further go on to note that "technology is not only embodied and 
codified but has a large tacit element to it. Tacit knowledge refers to those aspects of technology 
that are embodied in the organisational routines and collective expertise or skills of individuals and 
teams [13]. To be in possession of knowledge in terms of holding the dominant discourses, beliefs 
and ideas is important; however, to be in possession of knowledge in terms of holding the 
preeminent scientists, technology and production skills, confers a huge power on the proprietor. 
This is not a new phenomenon, and regarding space power is clearly observed in the immediate post 
WWII ‘space race’. Cadbury [22] tells us that “In the midwinter of 1945 [as] the war in 
Europe…reached its final stages”, the USA and the USSR fought to locate and liberate the V2 
blueprints and those with the know-how to use them. While several of von Braun’s scientific team 
aimed for the imagined safe haven of American territory, the USSRs “State Defence Committee set 
out plans to coordinate the activities of the army and the [People’s Commisariat for Internal Affairs] 
NKVD in the search for German weapons technologies” [22]. The aim of each state power was to use 
the Nazi blueprints, with the ‘tacit knowledge’ embedded in Wernher von Braun and his team. Both 
nascent superpowers were thus in 1945 aware of the power conferred by space technology and the 
tacit knowledge required to reproduce Nazi technologies. This continued understanding meant that 
the Cold War was a time of vastly increased military spending and accelerated technological 
advancement as both sides aimed to achieve a higher level of knowhow and production.  
  
It is clear that scholars will encounter problems in the application of traditional international 
relations theories to outer space: as Pfaltzgraff argues, “There is as yet no comparable basis for 
developing and testing theories about political relationships in space” [7]. However, drawing on 
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Dolman’s Astropolitik, he suggests that “geopolitical theory developed for the Earth and its 
geographical setting can be transferred to outer space” with the "strategic application of new and 
emerging technologies within a framework of geographic, topographic, and positional knowledge” 
[7]. This he argues, as we noted above, should be compared to those geopolitical theoretical 
constructs used to analyse nineteenth century naval power, a large aspect of which is the notion of 
prestige or reputation. The concept of ‘prestige’ combines knowledge as ideas – urging other states 
to believe in the dominant discourse of your power – and knowledge as technology – persuading 
other states that your higher level of technological knowhow confers military and financial 
superiority. If we acknowledge that IR theory can be applied to space activity, we might divide the 
structures of power into hard and soft power as international relations scholars do, and in doing so, 
we see that ‘spacepower’ draws on both. The hard power aspects are clear – the security threat 
posed by satellites, the unknown quantities that are space launches and the knowledge that such 
technology belies a great military prowess. The soft power aspects of space exploration are less 
explicit. However, as Lewis notes, “Space programs are an element of soft power; they provide 
prestige and technological prowess that can be turned into influence and leadership on the 
international stage” [23]. He goes on to remind us that in terms of prestige, space is the ultimate 
soft-power tool by noting that “When NASA manages to launch a shuttle, the world is reminded of 
America’s technological prowess” [23]. This high level of security and military prestige gave the USA 
a clear advantage during the Cold War. Indeed, on space issues, whether either side had 
an actual military advantage was considered less important than the prestige advantage conferred 
by succeeding where the other failed. The Soviet Union’s Sputnik success gave rise to widespread 
questioning of the fundamental ideals of liberal capitalism, while the tenets of liberal democracy and 
capitalism were shown to have produced the most technologically advanced event in history when 
the USA’s Apollo 11 mission landed humankind on the moon.  
  
Although the Cold War space race is now technically over, the competitive nature of state based 
innovation in space technology is not. However, we note that the way in which technology is 
promoted and used has changed. Andy Green, of UKspace, notes that “The UK space sector punches 
above its weight globally and continues to grow much faster than the UK economy. Space is a high 
growth, high productivity sector where targeted government investment generates further industrial 
investment and creates highly skilled jobs. It is a key enabler that is critical for our national 
economy” [24]. Where previously states fought for the ‘hearts and minds’, the ideas, ideals and 
ideologically based dominant discourses, and used success in space as demonstrative tool, 
contemporary space sectors have adjusted to see space as an economic ‘enabler’. This change is 
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observed by by Koepping –Athanasopoulos who notes that “Budget allocations for the exploration of 
the solar system as well as for human spaceflight have stagnated… While ESA’s overall budget has 
vastly increased over the past eight years, it appears as though policy-makers are interested in space 
applications, rather than in space exploration” [25]. The common usage of space hardware and 
exponentially increased public use of space technology has huge implications for private markets as 
well as public facilities and government and most space activity in contemporary society is based 
around the design, launch, maintenance and running of satellites in earth’s orbit. Indeed, the 
importance of satellites has increased exponentially since Sputnik made its name circumnavigating 
the earth. Today the military, global transport networks, the global financial markets and the world 
trading system all rely on global positioning technology and satellite communication to function. Of 
note, although many satellite launch companies are privately owned, or of public-private 
partnership status, the majority of launch facilities remain state based, or intergovernmental in 
nature, and “also have a wide range of productivity enhancing effects on other sectors” [24]. 
Therefore, as competition increases for capital and private investment, it could be argued that 
recent innovation in state based space activity is driven by the private sector’s need for efficient, 
safe and timely launch facilities, and by governmental desire to see overall, national economic 
growth. The need to persuade the population of the superiority of ideological stance or knowledge 
base, has, it would seem been somewhat replaced by a need for innovation and technological 
advancement to provide the best service to the private sector and to find high tech solutions to new 
problems as they arise. Society may have lost the romantic attachment to space activity, but we 
have gained important technology. 
 
5.1 knowledge as pop power  
 
It may not be the romantic notions of space, or its incorporation into the artistic realm that has led 
to the re-ignition of space activity as a popular topic. The extent to which extra-earth placed 
technology has entered the realm of necessity is equally important. Populations demand internet 
connection as a Human Right; our powers of free expression and communication require the ability 
to communicate instantaneously around the globe; and interference to satellite communication 
structures would thus be considered a breach of fundamental rights. Such is the importance of this 
new level of structural communication for the military, the global market, transport, trade, human 
development and human rights, that the interference or cessation of such services is considered a 
tool of warfare. Space, in relation to Strange’s structures of power, may thus be in the process of 
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change: we may argue that we are shifting from a knowledge power base, to a power structure 
based once again on militarization the economic power structure and the production structure [25].  
 
However, although militarization and the economic power structure do not seem largely compatible 
with the notion of popularisation, or Strange’s ideals and ideology knowledge structure, Cuaron’s 
2013 space debris thriller Gravity demonstrated the fact that space remains a popular topic. This 
recent block-buster highlighted the need to examine this issue further, to create the technologies 
required to decommission satellites safely and successfully, to remove debris from space and to 
create policy in support. The days of space innovation are not over, they have entered a new phase, 
perhaps a new pragmatic phase, where new problems require solutions, where films address the 
exciting issues of the day. Only when we are no longer interested in space, or in the technologies we 
have based in space, will innovation cease, and will popular culture stop drawing on space activity 
for inspiration.  
  
6.  Conclusions: geopolitical strategic space  
  
This paper has sought to demonstrate the importance of space to humankind, and to discuss the 
means by which space has been used and popularised at different times, in different ways to explain, 
to help build a knowledge base, to develop dominant discourse and to bring together communities. 
Although space uses, enhances and draws upon many different conceptions of power, the 
knowledge power structure is arguably the most important to contemporary analysis of space 
exploration and activity. This paper has outlined the importance of different conceptions of power in 
space, looking at Susan Strange’s IPE power structures, concepts relating to sea-power and Dolman’s 
seminal 2005 Astropolitik theory. Through analysis of the knowledge structure within the concept of 
international political economy theory, space activity has been shown to incorporate different forms 
of knowledge: knowledge as ideas and knowledge as technology.  
  
Knowledge in terms of ideas, ideals and technology is central to our understanding of space 
exploration and activity. It is also central to political discourse. Politicians are accountable to the 
public, and although space may appear to be minor aspect of public policy, it can be a very costly 
element. Moreover, legitimation of government policy and ideology in terms of knowledge, wealth, 
production and military can come from a successful space programme. Indeed, we should note that 
as a structural component of the international political economy, winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
the people is an incredibly important factor in the cultural imperialism that promotes social and 
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political hegemony. From John Donne to David Bowie, popular European artists have used outer 
space as inspiration; while Star-Trek, Star Wars and other Hollywood sci-fi franchises owe outer-
space an enormous cultural debt. 
 
Knowledge as an aspect of production and technology is also a fundamental requirement for space 
activity. This is scientific, technological, production-enhancing knowledge, without which space 
exploration is impossible. The importance of space is further enhanced by the fact that the means by 
which knowledge is transferred and communicated is now largely space based: internet, television, 
radio, mobile phone, and broadcasting is dependent on satellite communication. While this aspect 
of space knowledge is less attached to the cultural facets of beliefs, ideals and ideas, and more 
closely aligned with technological or scientific breakthroughs, it nonetheless is of significant 
importance to states and individuals.   
  
The two different forms of knowledge meet in space. While Cold War rockets and the threat of 
intercontinental destruction increased prestige and military power, the popularisation of the space 
race did much to promote respective political regimes and ideology. In 1957, the Soviet Union 
launched their satellite Sputnik, a non-military orbiter designed to parade technological know-how. 
Despite American confidence in their knowledge production and superior liberal capitalist ideas, the 
Soviet Union achieved satellite launch first. Militarily, Sputnik itself did very little; however, socially, 
politically and in terms of power relations Sputnik was a game changer. The success of Sputnik left 
the US, its politicians and citizens questioning the utility of not only their scientific and military 
expertise, but also questioning liberal capitalist democracy. Knowledge as ideas, and knowledge as 
technology underpinned the Cold War.  
  
Technological advancement, accelerated by the twentieth century’s love affair with worldwide 
warfare, may mean that it is remembered as the century of space rather than the century of 
destruction. Space was truly popularised: from the global excitement of the moon landings, to 
widespread popular engagement with space based technologies, the global population is now more 
fully engaged with space than at any previous point in history. Although perfecting launch facilities 
for use by private corporations may not be the most romantic of engagements with space, the 
altering relationship between state and market has required this shift. Nonetheless, however, space 
activity and exploration continues to light up the public imagination. 
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This paper has examined the popularisation of space as part of a system of knowledge power, 
evaluating the importance of ideas and ideals in the cultural arena; and examining state based 
domination of production knowledge and technology. We have focused on Susan Strange’s States 
and Markets analysis of the International Political Economy [3]addressing structural power and 
knowledge. If we should continue this discussion, we must examine the historical links between 
space technology and pop culture, to ask: is popular ‘knowledge’ more desirable than scientific 
‘knowledge’. Alternatively, does popular ‘knowledge’ help us to disseminate technological 
information? Do we need the filter of popular culture to create a cultural identification with outer 
space? Moreover, in this technologically advanced era, can we have a direct relationship with space 
and space technology that does not require the filter provided by the arts? Mankind has a changed 
relationship with space. We have made that one huge step onto the moon, and we have become 
reliant on space based technology. What now remains to be seen is whether our interest in space 
will wane as it enters the realm of the everyday, or whether our ideals, prestige and power will 
remain tied to space as the technological aspects become ever more tied to economic success and 
military power.  
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